Covering Your Tracks - Anti-forensics for Memory


No matter what you do as a hacker, at some point you are going to traverse memory. Computers can
almost be thought of as recording devices; anything a user does gets recorded somewhere and memory is a good place to start forensic investigations. This may sound like it is therefore impossible to completely avoid leaving a footprint of some kind on a computer and while that may be true to at least some extent, there are ways to avoid detection from memory acquisition tools. But before understanding these methods it is first necessary to understand how these memory acquisition tools work.
Volatility is an open source framework written in python. It contains numerous plugins to analyze a memory dump. Memory dumps can be obtained from tools such as AccessData FTK Imager which is nothing more than loading the program and then choosing File >> Capture Memory and then choosing where to save the .mem file. Once the memory is acquisitioned it can be analyzed with volatility commands (volatility is a command line tool) such as (Davis, 2017):
volatility -f <memory_filename>.mem imageinfo
The command above returns the operating system (suggested profiles) along with some other system information such as the number of processors. Once the profile has been obtained the running processes at the time of capture can be found with the command (Davis, 2017):
volatility -f <memory_filename>.mem --profile=<profile_name> psscan
The results of this scan will likely show a couple processes of svchost.exe. This is normal, however, a lot of malware will use svchost.exe to try and hide. Svchost has a parent process of services.exe and if services.exe Pid differs from a the svchost parent Pid (PPid), chances are svchost is malware. The executable for this malware can then be dumped using the following command (Davis, 2017):
volatility -f <memory_filename>.mem --profile=<profile_name> procdump -p 3960 --dump-dir=./
Volatility will then return whether the process is malware or not. In the case that it is malware the hash of the file can be obtained (e.g. the location of --dump-dir=./ or the current working directory) and uploaded to virus total to gain more information:
memdump in place of procdump dumps the code of the process instead of the executable and can be used for analyzing the actual code of the process. Volatility can be used for more than memory analysis; it can also use the netscan plugin to see listening and established network connections (Davis, 2017).
While it’s common for there to be numerous svchost.exe processes some processes such as lsass.exe should only appear one. lsass stands for local security authority subsystem service and handles authentication and passwords. If this process becomes unstable then the computer will need to be re-booted (which may be beneficial for malware avoiding forensics). Seeing a process like this twice is also a good indicator that malware has infected the machine (Davis, 2017).
Avoiding tools all together like volatility is possible. As may have already been inferred earlier with the svchost.exe and its services.exe parent; injecting malware into the services.exe is possible. If malware code injection is done right, it may be able to avoid detection from anti-virus software and forensic analysts using volatility. Process injection is having malware insert itself or code into a process, very similar to how a virus infects a cell.
Other methods exist for avoiding detection from memory forensic tools such as Kernel debugger block hiding. The static kernel structure KdDebugBlock finds the base address of a kernel image and can be found by scanning for the OwnerTag member (a “KDBG” static string). Overwring the OwnerTag disrupts memory acquisition or prevents it all together.
Memory acquisition debuggers rely on symbols to read physical address space and these symbols such as MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges() can be patched to return NULL which prevents debuggers from seeing the physical address space layout (Stuttgen & Cohen, 2013). This requires some in-depth knowledge of assembly and the operating system’s kernel. Demonstration is out of scope for this blog but an interesting article on these techniques can be found in the link below:
Anti-memory forensics is an advanced topic that requires knowledge of processes and their innerworkings. Thankfully there is also an abundant amount of resources to assist in learning about memory forensics. 13Cubed is an excellent YouTube channel for learning about memory forensics with volatility as well as other forensic techniques such as exploring the registry.
Another great resource for practicing memory forensics with volatility is the Memory Samples that volatility provides. These are memory dumps of malware such as the famous Stuxnet which can be downloaded and then loaded into volatility via the link below:
In closing, while it may be impossible to avoid leaving a footprint of some kind on a computer, methods can be used to make a forensic analyst’s work hard. Techniques also exist where malware to crash debuggers such as volatility. Additionally, malware can hide in locations such as the BIOS making detection even more difficult. These techniques are advanced and normally if a well-crafted exploit such as this is discovered; it may be a nation-state attack of some kind. That make this topic all the very cool and is why everyone should download a kali linux or Parrot OS distro and download the Memory Samples above to learn more. Happy hacking!
References
Davis, R. (2017, May 25). Introduction to Memory Forensics [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PAGcPJFwbE
Stuttgen, J. & Cohen, M. (2013). Anti-forensic resilient memory acquisition. Retrieved from
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S1742287613000583?token=765FF84F83827C8BB93C43AE83292A4E2FFB484034C301EB19F83291B1C809BE70B6EBDBE0C5098346F2C4E1F73DAC1A

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